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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CLAUDE L. HAYES 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No, 92085CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a conviction on the charge of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code annotated 
76-6-302, rendered by a jury impaneled before the Honorable Stanton 
M.Taylor. Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
annotated, 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendants guilt 
of aggravated robbery, after the misidentification of the Defendant 
on two prior occasions by the primary witness who testified 
concerning the robbery. 
2. Were the statements of the Defendant obtained by Officer 
Stubbs imadmissible as a violation of Defendant's rights pusuant to 
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 88 S Ct 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 694 
(1966). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-3 02 : Aggravated Robbery. 
1. A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
********* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on the charges of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony following a jury trial 
before the Honorable Judge Stanton M. Taylor on the 2nd and 3rd day 
of September, 1992. Defendant was sentenced on the charge on the 
28th day of September 1993 to serve a term in the Utah State Prison 
of not less than five (5) and which may be for life at the Utah 
State Prison. 
The Defendant filed for post conviction relief requesting that 
he be granted an appeal which was received by the Clerk of the 
Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah on the 7th 
day of October, 1992. 
This appeal, which was directed to the Court of Appeals for 
the State of Utah, for which, on the 9th day of October 1992, 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Court of Appeals, filed a 
certificate on Appeal No. 92085CA on the 7th day of October, 1992. 
That on the 9th day of October 199 2 the Defendant signed the 
affidavit of Impecuniosity which was filed with the Clerk of Weber 
County, and that counsel, John T. Caine, was appointed to represent 
the Defendant as the result of the Defendant's motion for 
appointment of counsel to represent him in this appeal which was 
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received by the Clerk of the District Court of Weber County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 16th day of June 1992, at approximately 10:00 o'clock 
p.m., Mrs. Anthea Benally was employed by Kar Kwik at 710 
Washington Blvd, Ogden, Weber County, Utah. Some minutes before 
10:00 p.m. Mrs Benally was at the check out counter and her co-
worker, Brent Hoth, was working in another part of the store. At 
that time there was only one other person in the store. Mrs 
Benally testified that she was in approximately the middle of the 
store looking over the merchandise. Eventually that person grabbed 
some chips and brought them over to the counter. That person threw 
the chips on the counter and asked for a package of cigarettes. 
(Tp. 17) Mrs. Benally reached for the requested cigarettes and 
then started to ring up the sale. As Mrs. Benally was ringing up 
the sale, the customer came beside Mrs. Benally and in a quiet 
voice said " This is a robbery11. Mrs. Benally questioned whether 
the customer was serious. (Tp. 19) The customer to show he was 
serious grabbed Mrs. Benallyfs arm and placed the scissors to a 
point about five inches from Mrs. Benally!s body. Mrs. Benally 
finally opened up the till and the customer reached in the till, 
grabbed all the paper money and stuffed it in a side pocket of a 
jacket he was wearing. The customer warned Mrs. Benally not to 
call the cops and then walked out the side door and into a dark 
area, from which neither Mrs. Benally or her assistant were able to 
see him again. Immediately thereafter, Mrs. Benally called the 
police. The Police arrived in approximately ten minutes. During 
3 
the call she had described the robber to the police. 
Approximately twenty minutes later the police take Mrs. 
Benally to the vicinity of 27th and Monroe, where they showed to 
her a young black man they had in custody. Mrs. Benally identified 
that man as the one who had robbed her (Tp. 25) . To be sure Mrs. 
Benally requested that the police have the suspect walk closer to 
the police car and shine the brighter lights on his face. Mrs. 
Benally then was sure of the identity of the suspect as the 
individual who robbed her on the 16th of June (Tp. 48) 
Next Mrs. Benally went to the police station in the middle of 
the 2 600 block of Washington Blvd in Ogden at the request of the 
police. There the suspect walked down the hallway, where Mrs. 
Benally again identified the same person as the one who held the 
scissors to her and robbed the store (Tr. 47). However, from the 
beginning Officer Stubbs of the Ogden City Police Department was 
talking Mrs. Benally out of identifying the first suspect as the 
individual who committed the crime. (Tp. 118) 
Later Mrs. Benally was asked to identify the Defendant from 
multiple pictures which she was shown at the preliminary hearing on 
the 25th of June, 1992. At that time the police did not include 
the picture of the suspect she had previously identified, but did 
include a picture of the Defendant. From those pictures Mrs. 
Benally picked the Defendant as the individual who robbed the store 
(Tp. 51,52) 
Early in the morning of the 17th of June, 1992 one, Gayle 
Herrera, left the Defendant and went to the police station in 
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Ogden, Utah. She was directed to officer Stubbs, where she related 
that she had been with the Defendant prior to and subsequent to the 
robbery of the Kar Kwik. (Tp. 84) . Ms. Herrera indicated to 
Officer Stubbs that the Defendant and she parked his automobile in 
back of Kar Kwik on 7th and Washington Blvd, that the Defendant 
left the car allegedly to borrow some money and when the Defendant 
came back the Defendant and Ms Herrera drove away (Tp. 84-88). 
After Ms. Herrera told her story to Officer Stubbs, the 
officer requested Ms. Hererra help him find where the Defendant 
lived. Ms. Hererra went with Officer Stubbs to locate the car, a 
gray Buick Riveria, which they found parked by a tree and some 
other businesses, and then located the apartment number where the 
Defendant was staying. (Tp. 92-93, 125) 
Subsequently, Officer Stubbs took a surveillance team out to 
the apartment. Then Officer Stubbs left to obtain search warrants 
for both the car and the apartment (Tp. 127) 
Sometime around 2:00 PM on the 17th of June, 1992, Office 
Stubbs, with three other Ogden City policeman and one officer from 
the Clearfied, Utah police Department knocked on the door of the 
apartment to execute the search warrant. Upon entering the 
apartment and searching the apartment the officers found the 
Defendant in the middle bedroom. 
At that point Officer Stubbs indicated that "I took him into 
custody without incident. (Tp. 132). Officer Stubbs believed that 
he had arrested the Defendant for the robbery of the Kar Kwik store 
on the evening of the 16th of June, 1992 (Tp. 133). 
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After the Defendant was taken into custody, Officer Stubbs 
testified that "Claude appeared quite upset and interrupted me 
saying. "This is the — this is the critical phrase - - "The coat 
was in the closet. He'd been coked up at the time and would plead 
guilty. He threw the scissors somewhere, but doesn't know where 
because he was coked up." (Tp. 133-134, 143) Immediately after 
making the statement Officer Stubbs decided that he had better read 
him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra. (Tp. 135, 143) 
After reading the Defendant his Miranda rights, the Defendant made 
no further statements about the crime (Tp. 136,137, 143) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence of Defendants guilt was insufficient to 
demonstrate his guilt of aggravated robbery. Given the 
circumstances involved in this case that the primary witness, 
who was also the victim in the case, within a short time after the 
commission of the crime, twice identified, not by photographs, but 
after personal inspection, first by auto lights, and then in better 
light at the police station, another person as the perpetrator of 
the crime, and only after affirmative persuasion and a photo review 
that did not contain a photo of the prior suspect, did she identify 
the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime and also that the 
only other witness was shown only a photo of the Defendant and not 
the other suspect, casts doubt as to the validity of their identity 
of the suspect as the perpetrator of the robbery. Second, the 
Defendant, after being in custody and being served a search 
warrant, WHICH CONFESSION RESULTED DIRECTLY FROM THE FUNCTIONAL 
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EQUIVALENT OF INTERROGATION BY THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, but before 
his Miranda rights were given, made a confession, which confession 
was admitted in evidence of the objections of Counsel for the 
Defendant was harmful error in that it significantly led to the 
conviction of the Defendant for the crime in question. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
The standard established for an Appellate review of the 
sufficiency of evidence is well established. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
"It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the 
facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the lines 
most favorable to the verdict; and that if when so 
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the Defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt the verdict will not be disturbed.11 
Citing case State v. Ward, 347 P. 2d 865, 869 (1959 footnote 
omitted.) 
The Utah State Supreme Court has held in State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d, 342 Utah 1985: 
"That we review the evidence and all inferences which may 
be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted". 
See also State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d, 942 (Utah 1982), 
State v. Martinez, 709 P. 2d, 355 (Utah 1985). However, the Utah 
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Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to stretch the 
inference beyond gaps in the evidence as in the case of 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d, 443,444 (Utah 1983), where the Court 
said: 
"Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the juryfs 
decision this Court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The 
fabric of evidence against the Defendant must cover the 
gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of 
guilt." 
The Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery. Section 
76-6-302 of the Utah Code Annotated indicates that: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined 
in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury to another. 
•k'k'kick'k'k-k-k'k'k'k 
Section 76-6-301, UCA defines robbery as ff the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear.11 
To convict the Defendant of this charge the jury not only had 
to find that under the definition of that statute an aggravated 
robbery actually did occur but also that they were convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the Defendant actually was present at the 
scene and perpetrated that offense. 
The focus of this appeal is whether the jury could reasonably 
believe that the Defendant, Mr. Hayes, was the person who actually 
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committed the robbery, after the victim first had twice identified 
another suspect as the perpetrator of the crime, and the Ogden City 
Police Department deliberately and conscientiously convinced the 
victim that she was wrong in her first and second identification of 
the perpetrator of the crime. 
There is no dispute that Kar Kwik convenience store at 710 
Washington Blvd, Ogden, Utah was robbed by a black male wearing a 
dark blue, slick looking jacket at approximately 10:00 p.m. on the 
evening of June 16, 1992. At the time of the robbery the principal 
clerk, Mrs. Benally, was forced to open the till, where the 
individual grabbed all the bills and departed. Immediately 
thereafter Mrs. Benally called the Ogden City Police Department to 
report the robbery. Within approximately one hour after the 
robbery the Ogden Police Department took Mrs. Benally to the 
vicinity of 27th and Monroe in Ogden for the purpose to identify a 
potential suspect. Upon arriving at 27th and Monroe the suspect 
was standing in front of the police car. After some looking and 
requesting the suspect to be brought closer to the headlights of 
the police car for better view, Mrs. Benally identified the suspect 
as the individual who had robbed her that evening in the said Kar 
Kwik location. The police then drove Mrs. Benally to the police 
station in the 2 600 block of Washington Blvd in Ogden, where Mrs 
Benally in full light again saw the suspect walking down the hall. 
Again after seeing another view of the suspect she again identified 
him as the perpetrator of the robbery. Mrs. Benally was confident 
that she had identified the robber, and except for the actions of 
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Officer Stubbs of the Ogden City Police Department would have been 
in Court testifying against that suspect rather than the Defendant. 
This is because at that moment she was convinced that the police 
had apprehended the right suspect. Shortly afterwards, Officer 
Stubbs showed Mrs. Benally photographs of other black individuals, 
including the Defendant, but not the individual Mrs. Benally had 
previously identified as the perpetrator, for identification. At 
which time she identified the Defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. Since the Defendants photograph and the initial suspect's 
photographs were not both included together it is purely conjecture 
which of the two individuals she would have identified, had the 
police included both photographs. Moreover, it is further 
conjecture of whether Mrs. Benally would have remained convinced 
she had identified the correct suspect, except for the affirmative 
action of the Ogden City Police Department in convincing her she 
had identified an innocent suspect. 
No further action was taken until Gayle Herrera, an admitted 
drug addict, came voluntarily to Officer Stubbs and tells her 
story, implicating the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. 
Gayle Herrera visits Officer Stubbs at approximately 4:00 a.m. 
and tells the officer a story about the robbery of the Kar Kwik the 
previous evening. She admits that she had known the defendant only 
a couple of days, during which they had both been using drugs and, 
in fact, were both high on drugs the evening of the Sixteenth of 
June. Never did Ms. Herrera see the Defendant enter the Kar Kwik 
which was robbed, nor did the Defendant admit that he had just 
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robbed the convenience store. In fact, the Defendant told Ms. 
Hererra that he was going to borrow some money. Ms. Hererra had no 
personal knowledge that, in fact, the Defendant either intended to 
or did rob the said Kar Kwik. 
However, she did have personal knowledge of the make, color, 
and partial license plate of the car the defendant was driving, and 
also where the Defendant was residing. With that knowledge Ms. 
Hererra showed Officer Stubbs the location of the automobile and 
also where the Defendant was staying. 
Based upon that information Officer Stubbs put a surveillance 
on the automobile and the apartment house, and also obtained a 
search warrant to search the car and the apartment for both 
scissors and a blue jacket. 
Taking three other Ogden City Police Officers plus one 
Clearfied, Utah Police Officer to the apartment, he knocked on the 
door, was admitted into the apartment by another black male, 
believed to be the Defendant's brother and began a search of the 
apartment. Pursuant to that search the Defendant was located in a 
middle bedroom. First, Officer Stubbs took the Defendant into 
custody. Second, Officer Stubbs identified himself as Detective 
Stubbs from the Ogden City Police Department. Third, informed the 
Defendant he was investigating the Kar Kwik robbery at 7th and 
Washington and that he believed that the Defendant did it. In 
fact, Officer Stubbs told the Defendant that the person driving his 
car had given him up. Fourth, that he was there with a search 
warrant, was going to search the house for the coat and the 
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scissors used in the robbery. 
Next, Officer Stubbs testified that the Defendant appeared 
quite upset at that time, and interrupted what he was saying by 
telling him the coat was in the closet. The Defendant had been 
coked up at the time and would plead guilty. The Defendant said 
that he had thrown the scissors somewhere, but he doesn't know 
where because he was coked up. 
Finally, Officer Stubbs testified that he interjected with the 
Miranda warnings and the Defendant said nothing else after 
receiving the Miranda warnings. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 7th Circuit ruled in 
Webster v. Duckworth, 767 F.2d, 1206, (1985),: 
"That the absence of competence substantive evidence to 
support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whether the result of prosecutorial inability, judicial 
error or recalcitrant witness requires acquittal either 
at trial or on appeal." 
The Supreme Court of Washington considered this general rule in the 
case of State v. Allen, 574 P. 2d, 1182, (1978) where the Court 
ruled that: 
"Doubt of guilt cannot co-exist with conviction of guilt; 
any fact in evidence may, under particular circumstances, 
raise doubt of guilt which would not otherwise exist, if 
doubt is raised, it follows that jury is not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt of Defendant and must 
acquit." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah confirmed the 
Defendant's theory in the case of State v. Mecham, 456 P. 2d 156, 
(1969); where although the Court affirmed the Defendant's 
conviction, the Court indicated that: 
"Not withstanding the fact that exact date of indecent 
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assault was never made a particular issue at the trial by-
notice of alibi or otherwise, except as witnesses were 
questioned as to what happened on that date, State had 
the burden to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and this evidence of Defendant's being elsewhere 
was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his 
being involved in the crime, he should be acquitted." 
This language relates to the present case and shows that the 
Supreme Court is cognizant of the potentiality of a jury conviction 
when the facts seem to preclude the possibility of the Defendant 
actually committing the offense. The Court is clear in its 
assertion that in such a case the Defendant is to be acquitted. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be used in Utah 
regarding sufficiency of the evidence in State v. Romero, 554 P. 2d, 
216, 1976: 
"The status is of the standard for determining 
sufficiency of evidence is whether it is so inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not 
reasonably believe the Defendant had committed a crime.11 
In the present case the jury gave unreasonable credibility to 
the testimony of Mrs. Benally in believing her identification of 
the Defendant after she had first been convinced of the innocence 
of the first suspect. Further, the second and only other witness to 
the commission of the crime, Brent Hoth, despite the fact that he 
was in the police station at the same time as the first suspect, 
never was asked to view that suspect to determine if he believed 
said individual committed the crime. (Tp. 72, Lines 11-33). 
Further, Mr. Hoth was shown pictures of the Defendant and other 
black individuals, but did not include a photo of the first 
suspect. (Tp. 74 Lines 16-18) Mr. Hoth admitted that he did not 
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get a good look at the perpetrator of the crime, (Tp. Lines 20-21) 
and further described the perpetrator only in generic terms, black 
male 5"9", 51 10", medium build, average features with no 
distinguishing marks, or identity (Tp. 75, Lines 9-11). This 
description would fit many black individuals. Further, Mr. Hoth is 
not very helpful in describing the jacket the perpetrator wore the 
night of the robbery. He described it merely as "long sleeve, 
something on, Navy blue". (Tp. 76, Line 10) This description 
could also fit numerous jackets and contains no specific 
identifying features. 
The Defendant defends his position with the basic rule that a 
conviction without evidence of guilt clearly violates his rights to 
due process of law. 
The Defendant points to the precedence set in United States 
Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US 510, 1979; in which 
the Court ruled that jury may not be instructed that: 
"The law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts." 
Because of the 14th Amendment Due Process requirement, that 
the State must prove each and every element of a defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt and to accept the quoted presumption conflicts 
with the stronger and overriding presumption of innocence, which 
everyone accused of offense is entitled to. 
The Utah Supreme Court followed this ruling in the case of 
Utah v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (1982). The Defendant argues that 
this line of cases precludes situations, such as in the current 
case, where the Defendant is not clearly identified as the 
14 
perpetrator of the robbery and that, therefore, the jury is being 
expected to presume that because he was tenuously identified as 
being the robber, that he must have in fact committed the robbery 
charged by the State. Such a presumption without any direct 
evidence is clearly violative of the Defendants right to due 
process. 
POINT II 
Miranda Issue 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCLUDE 
THE DEFENDANTS CONFESSION OF GUILT 
MADE TO OFFICER STUBBS, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
MIARANDA RULE (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 
16 L.E. 2nd 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
A fundamental right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 12 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah is, no person shall be 
compelled to give testimony against himself (self incrimination). 
In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra the United States Supreme 
Court held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 
of the Defendant, unless is demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 64 L.Ed. 
2nd 297, 100 S. CT 1682, L ED at Page 305. 
Based on the following uncontroverted facts it is argued that 
the prosecution in using the Defendants admission of guilt violated 
the Defendants right against self incrimination, as set forth in 
the constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah. On 
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the afternoon of June 16, 1992, Office Stubbs of the Ogden City 
Police Depart, at approximately 2:00 p.m. with three other officers 
of the Ogden Police Department and one Officer of the Clearfied, 
Utah Police Department knocked on the door of an apartment in 
Clearfied, Utah where they believed the Defendant was residing. A 
black male answered the door and Officer Stubbs asked for Claude 
Hayes. Officer Stubbs was told by the male that Claude wasn't 
there. However, Officer Stubbs executed the search warrant, 
secured the house, place the black male and either his wife or 
girlfriend in the living room, and found Claude Hayes in the 
bedroom with a sleeping child (Tp. 128, Lines 4-22). 
Officer Stubbs next stated that he took the Defendant into 
custody without incident. (Tp. 132 Line 12-13). Officer stubbs 
states that he next began explaining to Claude who he was and 
exactly why he was there and that he had a search warrant for the 
coat and scissors. Officer Stubbs testified that "there should 
have been no doubt in his mind he was under arrest for that robbery 
(kar Kwik on 7th and Washington in Ogden) and I (Officer Stubbs) 
believed he did it (Tp. 133, L 10-12). Officer Stubbs then 
testified "Claude appeared quite upset and interrupted me saying -
- - the coat was in the closet. He'd been coked up at the time and 
would plead guilty. He threw the scissors somewhere, but doesnfft 
know where because he was coked up" (Tp. 134, Lines 2-5__. After 
making the above statement Officer Stubbs read him his Miranda 
rights (Tp. 135 Lines 12-23). After hearing the Miranda rights, 
the Defendant made no further statements (Tp. 13 6, Lines 15-24) 
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The Defendant's Counsel made a motion to exclude the testimony 
of the confession, which motion to suppress was denied (Tp. 140 
Lines 17-23) 
In the instant case there is no question that at the time the 
Defendant made the admission of guilt he was in custody, nor is 
there any question that such confession was orally relayed to the 
Jury by Officer Stubbs. (Tp, 143 Lines 14-19). 
The only questions are one, whether the confession was made as 
a result of interrogation and two, whether such statement was 
voluntary• 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Rhode Island v. Innis, supra at Page 3 00 states: 
"We conclude, that the Miranda safeguards come into play 
whenever a person in custody is subject either to express 
questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to 
say, the term "Interrogation" under Miranda refers not 
only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of police (other than those normally 
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect. The latter portion of this 
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of 
suspect, rather than the intent of the police." 
Here you have five police officers in an apartment, first 
telling the other occupants in the apartment to stay away from the 
suspect and then in a relatively small apartment, Officer Stubbs, 
first, places the Defendant under arrest, second, explains to the 
Defendant who Officer Stubbs was, third, tells the Defendant that 
he believes the Defendant committed the robbery of the Kar Kwik at 
7th and Washington Blvd in Ogden, fourth, tells the Defendant that 
he believed he used a pair of scissors in the commission of the 
17 
crime and fifth, that he has a search warrant for the coat and 
scissors. 
In accordance with the standards established in Rhode Island 
v. Innis, supra, his course of conduct was likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the Defendant. Moreover, the conduct 
of Officer Stubbs was as close as asking the Defendant, "Where are 
the coat and scissors that you used to commit the robbery on the 
night of June 16th at the Kar Kwik on 7th and Washington in Ogden 
"without actually asking the question". 
Moreover, as contrasted with State v. Kelly, 718 P 2nd 385 
(198 6) this contact by Officer Stubbs was accusatory rather than 
investigatory. The Defendant was in sequence, taken into custody, 
told he had committed a crime, defined the exact crime he was 
accused of, served a search warrant for a coat and scissors used in 
the crime, made an incriminating statement and then read his 
Miranda rights. 
The last question raised is whether the confession of the 
Defendant was given voluntarily. The Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of State v. Bishop, 753 P 2nd 439 (1988) at Page 463 states: 
"When the State seeks to use an allegedly involuntary 
confession against a criminal defendant at his or her 
trial, he or she is "entitled to a reliable and clear-cut 
determination that the confession was voluntarily 
rendered." Lego v. Twomey 404 US 417, 92 S. Ct 619, 627, 
30 L.Ed. 2nd 618 (1972). In this regard, the State bears 
the burden of proving by at least a preponderance of the 
evidence that the confession was voluntarily given. 
In the instant case the Defendant was induced by accusatory conduct 
of Officer stubbs into giving the involuntary confession of the 
robbery of the Kar Kwik, which confession was testified to by 
18 
Officer Stubbs over the objection of Defendant's Counsel. (Tp. 
Pages 138-140) The confession served as the king-pin of the States 
case and without it, given the conflict existing in the evidence, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Defendant would have been 
acquited. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant Claude L. Hayes was improperly charged and 
convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
Defendant alleges that the jury convicted him on no substantial 
evidence that he in fact committed this crime, and that the 
evidence presented at trial cast doubt on the initial identity of 
the individual who committed the robbery and further the Court 
admitted the Defendant's involuntary confession, given before his 
Miranda rights were read to him. That, therefore, because of the 
faulty identification and if his confession is disregarded he is 
entitled to an acquittal on this charge. Inherent within this 
insufficiency of the evidence argument is if the primary witness 
had not been coached by the police as to the identity of the 
perpetrator of the crime and if no confession would have been 
admitted the jury in this case would not of haj^ sufficient evidence 
to convict him of aggravated robber. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \l^\ da\H of//At i^r^^j? 
JOHN T^C^INE 
rneyfor Appellant 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief to the Attprftev General's Office, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake Ci^r^utah J8/114, postage prepaid 
4.1-,--. \\y\
 d a y o f A p r i 1 / 1993. ' this 2 
iNW. CAINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
20 
ADDENDUM 
2 1 
17 
Q. Okay. And this one's for the — is this one for 
the outside --
A. The drive-up? 
Q. — the drive-up window? 
A. The drive-up window and then there's the gas till 
right here which is right by it. And then there's 
the other till. 
Q. So there's yet another -- so there were three 
tills? 
A. Yeah, except for the one you don't ring in. It's 
just to put the gas money in. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And he came up and he threw a bag of chips on the 
counter and --
Q. When you say "he", let me ask you, is that person 
here in the courtroom today? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Would you point him out to the jury, please? 
A. He's riqht there. 
MR. DAROCZI: Indicating the 
defendant, for the record, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Daroczi) Okay. 
A. He threw them on the counter and then he asked 
»*M »* IUII'K HI \i|\]aiu((ciu. l ilwuujht he said Kool 
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was about right here. And he said real quietly, he 
said: This is a robbery. 
And I looked at him and laughed because I 
thought that he was just joking. And then he goes: 
I'm serious, this is a robbery and I want you to open 
up the till now. 
And he just said that he wanted me to open up 
the till now. And -- and then after that it was like 
I could see him starting to — you know, he had a 
pair of scissors which he had held — 
Q. Let me stop you here, Anthea. 
A. Okay. 
MR. DAROCZI: Do we have a pair of 
scissors here? Maybe you could show us. Let's see 
if we have a pair here. (Clerk gives Mr. Daroczi 
scissors. ) 
Q. (By Mr. Daroczi) Would this be something 
similar? 
A. Yeah. 
Q< Okay. Why don't you be -- why don't you be him 
and show us how this was ~- this was held. And, 
let's see, I'll be you then. Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Did he hold them in the right hand? 
A. Yeah, he had them in the right hand. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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Q. Okay. What denominations, roughly? 
A. Just twenties, tens, and whatever was in the 
twenties drawer, I think. 
Q. Okay. Did the police come shortly thereafter? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. And did you describe the person who robbed 
you? 
A. I described him on the phone to them whenever I 
called. 
Q. Right on the phone? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. And did they also come to the store? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Okay. Were you taken to a location at 20 — was 
it 23rd and Monroe? 
A. 27th and Monroe. 
Q. 27th and Monroe, rather? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. There was a young black man there? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. You identified that person as your -- as 
the person who robbed you; is that correct? 
A. I did. 
Q. And then you did that again when you were taken 
to the station, the police station; is that right? 
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Now, let's look down at the specific questions 
on page two, if you would. And if you would look to 
about the top of that — I think it's the third 
question down after you have given a description. 
The question is, "Since the robbery, have you seen 
this person tonight?11 
Is that the question? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. And what was your answer? 
A. I put "Yes". 
Q. All right. Second question, "Where did you see 
him at?" 
And what was your answer? 
A. I put, "Where the police took me to identify, and 
walking through here." 
Q. "Where police took me to identify him" -- that's 
27th and Monroe -- "and walking through here." 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. "Here" means the station? 
A. Which was the hallway that he walked down. 
Q. Next question, "The person that you identified, 
is it the same person that held the scissors to you 
and robbed the store?" 
And your answer was? 
A. I put, "Yes". 
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Q. Okay. "What happened when police showed you this 
person?" 
Ana your answei v.^ !^ 
A. "I looked at him and I didn't think it was him 
because the clothing and the lighting was different. 
He definitely changed his jacket. Then he walked 
closer with -- walked closer with the brighter lights 
on his face, then I recognized him as the same 
person. " 
Q. Okay. Let's stop right there. 
A. Okay. 
Q. "Then he walked closer with the brighter light on 
his face, then I recognized him as the same person." 
When you're relating that in your statement, 
is that the incident up at 27th and Monroe — 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. -- you've just told us about? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Okay. Go to the next part of your answer. 
A. "Then when I saw him here in the office he looked 
over — he looked over here and I knew it was him." 
Q. "Then when I saw him here in the office he looked 
over here and I knew it was him." 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Are those your words? 
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2 Q. Became more sure of your identification after he 
3| was placed in the headlights of a vehicle, and then 
4 I when he came down here to the station in the full 
5 light of the police office, became even more 
6 certain --
7 A. Uh huh. 
8 Q. of your identification, and that's reflected 
9 in your statement. Isn't that true? 
10 A. It's true. 
11 Q. Not only -- you not only talk about height and 
12 size and color and that sort of thing, but especially 
13 getting into the specifics of a smirk on his face and 
14 distinguishable eyebrows. 
1!) A. Uh huh. 
J& Q- Right? And the only time after that — so that 
1 7 t h e
 jury is clear, you were never shown photographs 
1 8
 of any other individuals. 
19 A. Between what time? 
2 0 Q
- Between that evening and a preliminary hearing 
2 1 t h a t w a s h e l
^ on the 25th of June. Were you shown 
some photographs? 
2 3
 '
 A
*
 Y e d h/ I w a s shown some photographs. 
Q. Okay. Did you pick anyone out there? 
25 | A. Yeah, I did. 
24 
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Q. When did you do that? 
A. Shoo. I — oh, gol. I can't remember the exact 
date. 
Q. Okay. Was it within weeks of this or a month 
later or when was it? 
A. It was shortly after. 
Q. Okay. And who showed you these photographs? 
A. Stubbs did. 
Q. Uh huh. And did he tell you at the time that the 
individual that you had previously identified, he 
felt wasn't the man? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. Did he tell you he felt he had an alibi? 
A. No. 
Q. If you'd already made an identification, did they 
tell you why they were asking you to look at other 
photographs? 
A. Just to make sure -- make certain. 
Q. Just to make certain. Okay. 
Do you know whose picture you picked out of 
there? 
A. The second time? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. The second time I picked his picture 
(indicating). 
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Q. It's a different fellow. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does the name "Zaugg" — 
A, Yes, 
Q. -- ring a bell with you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. Now, let me have you take a look at 
that, just so, again, that the jury understands. The 
first part of that statement is a narrative, is it 
not? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. In other words, you were just asked to describe 
what happened and you did so in your own words; is 
that correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And then you were asked some specific questions 
and you responded to that. Is that, also, true? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And then after this was all done, it was typed 
up. Were you given an opportunity to read this 
before you signed it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you read it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And does it accurately reflect your words -- this 
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that same evening that may have been in the 
vicinity -- one of whom had a blue jacket on -- and 
asked to look at any of them? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. So the only time you made an 
identification then was afber this incident, you were 
shown some photographs; is that right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You picked one out; is that correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And then you went to a preliminary hearing where 
this defendant was seated there in the courtroom, 
basically, ready to go to hearing at that time, and 
you picked him out then; is that right? 
A. I don't think I went to the preliminary. 
Q. You didn't go to the prelim. So all you've done 
is seen some photographs; is that right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Not asked to make any other identifications? 
A. No. 
Q. Until today. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. There are no other black males in 
this courtroom today, are there? 
A. I don't believe there are. 
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Q. Take a look around just to make sure. 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Now, let's take a look at your statement 
for a minute, if you'll follow down with me to the 
specific questions, down there I believe it's the 
fourth question. It says, question, "Can you 
describe the person who robbed the store?" 
And will you read your answer, please? 
A. "He was a black male, 5'9", 5'10", medium build, 
average face. I don't remember if he had facial 
hair. ,f 
Q. Okay. Stop right there. That's your total 
description, isn't it? "S'^', 5'10n, medium build, 
average face. I don't remember if he had facial 
hair. !l 
A. Well, the other — 
Q. Well, we'll talk about -- then we're talking 
about what he had on. 
A. Okay. 
Q. But in terms of physical description of the 
individual, that's a]1 you said, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Average face, 5' 9" or 5 M 0 " , medium build. I 
don't know if ho had any faoial hair. That's it. 
A. Yuah. I think 1 iniiti that 1 think he might have 
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had some facial hair, but --
Q. Well, this says I don't remember if he had facial 
hair- Is that — 
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- what you signed, at least? 
A. Uh huh, 
Q. Okay. That's it. Then you say -- well, go 
ahead. Read on. What did you -- what did you next 
say? 
A. "Long sleeve something on, navy blue.11 
Q. Okay. Stop right there. That's your only 
description of any kind of a jacket, isn't it? "Long 
sleeve something on, navy blue'1? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Now, Mr. Daroczi has stood up in the courtroom 
today and waved State's Exhibit Number Two at you, 
and you said, that's it. Right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you tell them, in your statement, that it had 
a hood on it? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you tell them that it had a lining that 
looked like that in it? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. All you said is you saw something long 
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have to tell the truth? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Otherwise, you'll be committing a perjury. 
1v. Right. 
Q. would be another felony. 
Right. 
Q. rou don't want to do that, do you? 
A. 
All right. On the morning of June 17th, about 
four o'clock, did you come into the police station 
and talk to Detective Stubbs? 
Yes. 
At that point, how long had you known the 
defendant seated there, approximately? 
\ couple of days. 
7e had been -- we'd been kicking it together. 
What does that mean? 
Hanging ,n nnini with each other, getting high 
together. 
Q. Okay. What are you down here -- down at the 
prison for now? What are you in for? 
A. Because I'd been to prison before, and drugs. 
u . You ran into an undercover agent this 
t,. lid you? 
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A. Yeal1, ilh huh. 
Q. What happened the evening of June 16th, \i few 
1
 ( . • . . c a l k e d I : : • Det e c t i v e 
Stubbs, sometime after nine o'clock? Would you tell 
this jury here? 
\ 7 >i i.3 ci i t 1 :)e ; 11 ] right I went a : • .2s 
before I went in, and tried to clear my name from 
this stuff? 
Q. I'm sorry. Are you asking me a quest io 111 
A. Do you mean the night before or the night that I 
went to talk to Stubbs? You mean a few hours before 
that? 
Q. The evening before. 
A. day. I was really 1liglI. Me and Claude was out 
cruising around in his car. 
Q. Claude, meaning this gentleman here (indicating 
the defendant)? 
A. Yeah. 
C. Okay. His car. What kind of car? 
A. Y he Riviera, gray Riviera. 
Q. Buick Riviera? 
A. Yeah. 
(! "i 
A. We had been cruising around in his car getting 
high together. Okay. Right before I went and told 
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Stubbs what happened, Claude pulls over on the side 
.-•I the- road and tells me that I have to have sex witl 
says • " ' ' ' i - i n * ( because 1 w '*l l < |»" 
and I was -- but I needed the drugs so he -- we 1lad 
sex. Put it that way. 
And then it made me mad, so I went a::i :i 1: J : >] < i 
Stubbs what he did at the Kar Kwik. 
Q. All right What did he do at the Kar Kwik? Tell 
A. Parked in the back of Kar Kwik. He told me to 
wait for him, that he was going to go borrow some 
ley. He didn' ell me the truth th' 
to go rob it. He came back --
Q. Who drove up there towards that part of — the 
i lor ti I part 
A. I drove the car away after the -- away after he 
did it. 
i' kav. Now, who drove as you were going up there, 
up to the north part of town? 
A. Claude drove up there and then I drove -- 1le 
drove away by the park that the river runs by. 
Q. Park Boulevard there? 
A. Yeah. 
» Okay. 
A. And then I drove the rest up the hill. 
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>j. f>v-v. And did you park — okay. Tell us now, 
happens 
11 .i he park 01 in-, did -~ 
lie parked the car and told me to wait for him. 
waited ~~ 
Q. Did he say what he was going to do? 
A. He said he was going to go borrov; some money from 
some cousins, family members. 
Q. All right. 
He went in -- Ile went in wherever he went. I was 
still pushing my pipe. 
Q. Did you see a place down the street? Could you 
see? 
A. I wasn't looking. 
But I mean, could you? 
Yeah At ter I seen there was one Kar Kwi 
All right. 
Which was the only store around. 
But I wasn't worried about what he was doing. I 
was more worried about pushing my pipe. 
nderstand. 
A. And when he came back he was all sweaty and stuff 
and like scared and telling me --
Q I low much ] onger — how 1 ong was he goi ie? 
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A, About 15 minutes. 
Q. All right. 
A, ||«< was — ).- back really fast. 
Q. When you say "he came back really fast" w.i:- he 
walking or was he running? 
A, Basically running --
Q. Okay. 
back. He was all sweaty like he7d been doing 
something. So, anyways --
Q. Was he wearing any - what was he wearing? 
was wearing his blue jacket. 
Q. Blue jacket. 
A. It looks like that's it right there. 
State7'". K •«;)] i h i t Two? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Blue jacket? 
1. Yeah. Because I wore it for a wh 
Q. Okay. 
A. I was cold. 
* . So when you unsnap this, there'1 s a 1: i : :)ci 
that comes out? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. W a s i i
 l . . :he hood - - was tl li s t i i t t • 1 
down or was the hood showing? Was the hood up r h: 
head or how was it? 
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construction. 
3id you point that car out to Stubbs? 
Yea 1 i
 i c 1 1 • :i 1 : 1 < i :i I Stubbs ran --
and said Gayle, could it be Claude? And ; .-. ; . 
of „ y O U know what? I thought it was Bonnie -- you 
know Bonnie and Clyde? 
Q . ': •• 
A. Because I went to C.C. and 1 told C.C., this guy, 
he told me his name was Claude -- Clyde --
Claude, and I -- anyway, I told Stubbs I think *l 
Claude. 
Q. Claude or Clyde? 
A. Clyde. 
Q Clyde. Okay. 
A. And then when it came back as Claude, then I 
said, yeah, that's it. 
Q 1 when the registration was checker 
on and came back? 
A, Ye< i,l I 
Q Came back as Claude Hayes? 
A . IJ I: l 
Q. And then you remembered the name? 
A I 11 : ] • :i S11 i b 1 : «s 1 I c i I: 11 i < I a real s 1 i o r t ] a s t 
name. 
Q. Okay. Oka>- And so you spot the car, and what 
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about his — the apartment or -- was this an 
apartment or a house? 
!:  v ras ai 1 apartment. 
Okay. Was this an apartment complex? 
A. Yeah, but we didn L know the number, so I got out 
and went and looked at it. 
Q. Did you go with Stubbs? 
A . 1 1 :t 1 i 11: I S t u bbs stayed in the car. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But Stubbs told me not to get out because it was 
dangerous, and I told him that I wanted to do 11Iis 
Q. Okay. So what did you do? 
A. I went out and got the apartment number. 
i> , Okay. 
A. I can't remember what it was, but I came back and 
I told Stubbs. When I was walking across the street, 
w e c o i i ] ( 11 I: f j i i c I I: 1 i e car. We were like sur v e > i i :t g - -
whatever. The car was over by a tree. 
Q. Surveillance car? Oh, you mean his car was over 
by a tree. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Was there any mention or did you see 
any — any v/eapons, anything that might be a weapo:./ 
:di Claude got in the car though he said, 
!fWha* hem scissors?11. 
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Q. Okay. So Melvin White is also brought to the 
stat i 01 1? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You talked to Anthea? 
A. Yeah. 
Q . Did you have some - - what feelings d i d y o u 11 a \r e 
about her identifying Melvin White? 
Well, initially, I didn't, really. Understand, 
witness descriptions in one case will be excellent, 
the person will be right on. In others, they won't 
jiess descriptions are probably least 
strong weakest -- weakest link in a case It's 
not always that way, but on an average it is. 
Sometimes identifications are excellent. 
So I don't give them a whole lot of weight 
right off the bat, and with -- it's also my 
understanding 11 Iat Mr Melvin had beer 
alibi which we were starting to check out. 
So I tried to shake her identification before 
I even talked > Melvin -- when I talked 
office -- and was successful. By the time I had 
finished talking with her, her identification was > 
longer positive,, tl 101 igi I she felt it ma; • t. 
still. 
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this suspect , this person v/ho she was i.ilkinq l^.ont : ' 
A. Correct. On the morning of the 18th
 r 1 believe, 
"
,iV
 ic^i UL> how that went. 
i,: ....: . . * the office 11 Ie mori I :i, i i g • : f 1 1 Ie ] 811 i 
and she was straight -- excuse me -- at that time. 
L.oia ner I ileeded her to take me to where this 
apartment that she had been to. She seei ned confiden t 
that she could find it. So I put her " the car and 
followed her lead to the Clearfield area,, the 
Windsong Apartments, I believe. It's actually right 
on the border of Clearfield and Layton. 
V - . • •' " ". 
A. And we were looking both for the car, because she 
had remembered the license plate had a three eight 
zei >, not remember the rest of it. 
Q. This is before going down there she remembered 
the three eight zero? 
A . Correct. This is the first time I t a ] ) : e ; • :i t : 1: i e r 
she remembered the three eight zero. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But she v'uuivi!! ' '• remember the rest of; h. , And 
she felt confident it was also a gray Riviera, but 
not a brand new one. And she took me to the area of 
the Windsong Apartments and immediately -- we 
couldn't originally find the car because the entire 
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apartment. Records did show that that was listed 
offi : i a] ] y as 1 iis residence. And that if hi s car was 
there, the chances are that he was there. So I 
wasn't going to let him disappear. 
surveillance tear t n both the 
apartment and the car, with instructions that if 
anyone came out and got in the car, they took the cai 
wi t t. But they werer \ i - » 
untiI I returned. While they sat on the car and the 
house -- or the apartment, I came back in and 
:>bta i i ied a search warrant for bo11 i 11: ie : a:i : ai I i 11 I€ 
residence. 
Q. Looking for what did you put down that you 
were going to 3ook for, search for? 
A. was looking for a blue coat and a pair of 
scissors. 
0 Okay. 
A. And I think that's primarily what I put down. 
Okay. ^ ny money -- or did you okay. 
A. don't think I -- I don't think I put money 
because it was generic, as we call it. 
Q ( kay. 
A There's nothing -- nothing to distinguish i 1 fi n: 
other money any money anywhere that I could 
cie tei i t i.:i i ie , so — 
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that where it is? 
Q• Yeah, I'm a fa o i 11 -
A . 0ka"v I ' ^  ' e gc > t tha t marked on my computer c 
(2 • D o y o "i i : ' 
A. Yeah. 
'
 r
. The statement is, initially, 
Claude attempting to blend with the fixtures . i, ihe 
i i u i i u bedroom. " 
Do you see where we are now? 
Yes. Yes. 
^. All right. Now, at that point -- the next 
statement *' I t ook him into custody without 
incident. ,f 
A. Yes. 
Q . I assume from that that, in effect, y o \ i | ) ] < i c e ci 
him under arrest. 
A. Yes. 
:hat right? 
Yes. 
made that clear that that's w 1 iat y< : I i wei : e 
doing? 
/as in custody, under arrest. Yes. 
you tell him that 11e \ ',i;, in11it•r 
rou go i\ that same sentence saying, "I began 
explaining to Claude who I was and exactly why 1 was 
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there, and that I had a search warrant 
and scissors." 
That's correct. 
:- . A1 "! right I 11 assuming in that ai i I :: Drrect 
me if I'm wrong -- you, in effect, said, you're under 
arrest because I believe you committed the robbery at 
Kar Kwik on ~~ at 7th and Washington nqcien. 
Or is that 
A. Whether or not I would have used those exact 
words, i^ n'-h know, but there should hav 
doubt in his mind he was under arrest for that 
• -
 s
 ia 1 believed he did it, yes. 
Q. Okay. We]] , that's what I'm gettii . 
clear not only that he was under arrest, uui m a t 
was fin i robbery at Kar Kwik. 
A. Correct. 
«,» Okay. And that you believed that he'd u^-d a 
|ni .cissors. 
He definitely should have got that impression, 
yeah. 
Q. • * ;: • . All right. And this is after he was 
taken into custody, correct? 
Q Ile got that impression. All right. 
You then say, "Claude appeared guite upset and 
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interrupted me saying," this is the -- this is the 
critical phrase -- "The coat was in the closet. He'd 
been coked up at the time and would plead guilty. He 
threw the scissors somewhere, but doesn't know where 
because he was coked up." 
A. That's just about right. 
Q. All right. All right. That's what he said to 
you. And what I'm interested in is prior to saying 
that, did you, in fact, say to him, tell me where the 
scissors are because I know you've got them? 
A. No. I was still explaining why we were there, 
what I was looking for and what our intentions were. 
Q. All right. That's what I want to be clear on. 
We're here because I believe you committed a robbery 
at Kar Kwik and you used a pair of scissors. And I 
have a search warrant for those scissors. And I 
think you had on a blue jacket, and I've got a search 
warrant for that. 
A. I don't know if I described the jacket, but I 
would have said the coat you were wearing. 
Q. Okay. And I'm here -~ I've got a warrant -- I've 
got a search warrant to look for those. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Did you, in fact, say to him either show 
me where the jacket is -- where is the jacket? Where 
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are the scissors? 
A. No. 
Q. You did not. You simply explained you were there 
looking for those things. 
A. Yes. And that was my intention. 
Q. Okay. What I'm — what I'm interested in, did 
you ask him a direct question concerning either the 
coat or the scissors as to where they are, turn them 
over to me, I want them, where are they, anything 
like that? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. So that what you're telling me is 
that in the course of explaining to him why you were 
there, then he made this statement. And immediately 
upon making that statement, you then determined that 
you should Mirandize him, at least as I read the next 
sentence. 
A. I figured I'd better. 
Q. Yeah. The next — the next sentence says, "At 
that point I interrupted.11 I think it's -- or 
interjected, I think is what that says — 
"Interjected with Miranda.11 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. So, in effect then, you knew he was 
in custody. No question in your mind about that. 
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2 Q. You were telling him that you believed he 
3 committed a robbery and that you were, in fact, there 
4 to look for two particular items: A pair of scissors 
5 that would have been the weapon; and a coat that he 
6 had on. 
7 A, Correct. 
8 Q. And then he makes a comment which you immediately 
9 recognized as a significant comment. At that point 
10 you decide, I better Mirandize him. 
1 1 i* A. At the first break I says, you know, wait a 
12 minute. We've got to do this by the numbers. 
13 Q. Okay. And at that point you did Mirandize him. 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And gave him what you would routinely give 
16 someone that you were about to interrogate. At that 
17 point then, he said nothing further after that; is 
18 that right? 
19 A. Well, he thought about it. 
20 J Q. But he didn't make any other statements. 
A. And then thought that he -- told me that he 
22 | thought that he better not say anything further. 
Q. Until he talked to a lawyer. 23 
24 A . Basically, yes. 
25 Q. I think is what you said. So, in effect then, 
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once you Mirandized him in the context of this 
circumstance that we've just discussed, he made no 
further statements concerning his involvement, 
allegedly, in the Kar Kwik robbery, 
A, Correct. 
Q. All right. And no further statements were taken 
from him by you at a later date. 
A. Correct. 
Q. In connection with this. 
MR. CAINE: That's all I have, Your 
Honor. 
Do you have some questions? 
MR. DAROCZI: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CAINE: Having said that, in the 
time between that I had, the small time at lunch --
and I didn't get a chance to eat, which I'll discuss 
with the Court later --
THE COURT: Well, you've been saving 
up for that for years. 
MR. CAINE: Yes, I know. I knew it 
wouldn't break your heart, Your Honor. 
I had a chance to review the — what I believe 
at least to be -- the current view of the United 
States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court in 
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this area. And I'll acknowledge that the Court's 
preliminary view this morning is accurate to this 
extent, and that is that clearly the courts have said 
that extemporaneous or -- or expostulative type 
statements that are just thrown out are not 
considered to be in violation of Miranda. 
But these cases also -- particularly Gates 
against Illinois which was the big -- the big one 
where they talk about making some changes and some 
others -- the clear implication is that police 
officers need to be very careful in these areas, and 
that the courts have the right to look at all of the 
totality of what happened and make a decision as to 
whether in this case it did violate Miranda. 
And I would suggest in this case that while 
it's clearly -- at least as described by Detective 
Stubbs — it's clearly in the nature of — of 
something coming out, not necessarily in response to 
a direct question, you do have the other elements 
that are significant. You have a person who's 
clearly placed under arrest. No question about that. 
This isn't even a detention situation. He's under 
arrest. 
Secondly, he's told, I believe, in effect, you 
committed a robbery. Not only do I believe you 
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confrontation at that point. No question about it. 
This wasn't just a, well, you may be a suspect, and 
then it comes out. 
You're it, I'm here, I got you, in effect. 
And then a statement is made and then immediately we 
go to Miranda. It seems to me that this does fall 
within the gambit of requiring that Miranda should 
have been given as soon as that arrest was made and 
the defendant was told exactly why they were there. 
It's my view then that anything he said 
subsequent to that time, even though it was in the 
nature of a spontaneous kind of remark, we should 
suppress it. And that's our motion. 
MR. DAROCZI: I'll submit it, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
I don't think it would be appropriate for the 
Court to extend Miranda beyond the boundaries that 
have been laid down by both federal and state courts. 
Since this was not in response to interrogation, and 
even though it was clearly a custodial situation, the 
Court believes that since it was not in response to 
interrogation, the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
MR. CAINE: Thank you. 
MR. DAROCZI: Y o u r Hor>or , I d o 
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